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Abstract
Human-machine interaction is increasingly dependent on speech communication.
Machine Learning models are usually applied to interpret human speech com-
mands. However, these models can be fooled by adversarial examples, which are
inputs intentionally perturbed to produce a wrong prediction without being noticed.
While much research has been focused on developing new techniques to generate
adversarial perturbations, less attention has been given to aspects that determine
whether and how the perturbations are noticed by humans. This question is relevant
since high fooling rates of proposed adversarial perturbation strategies are only
valuable if the perturbations are not detectable. In this paper we investigate to
which extent the distortion metrics proposed in the literature for audio adversarial
examples, and which are commonly applied to evaluate the effectiveness of meth-
ods for generating these attacks, are a reliable measure of the human perception
of the perturbations. Using an analytical framework, and an experiment in which
18 subjects evaluate audio adversarial examples, we demonstrate that the metrics
employed by convention are not a reliable measure of the perceptual similarity of
adversarial examples in the audio domain.
Keywords: Adversarial Examples, Deep Neural Networks, Speech Command Classification, Speech
Recognition
1 Introduction
Human-computer interaction increasingly relies on Machine Learning (ML) models such as Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs) trained from, usually large, datasets [1, 2, 3, 4]. The ubiquitous applications
of DNNs in security-critical tasks, such as face identity recognition [5, 6], speaker verification [7, 8],
voice controlled systems [9, 10, 11] or signal forensics [12, 13, 14, 15] require a high reliability on
these computational models. However, it has been demonstrated that such models can be fooled
by perturbing an input sample with malicious and quasi-imperceptible perturbations. These attacks
are known in the literature as adversarial examples [16, 17]. Due to the fact that these attacks are
designed to be hardly detectable, they suppose a serious concern regarding the reliable application of
DNNs in adversarial scenarios.
The study of adversarial examples has focused primarily on the image domain and computer vision
tasks [18], whereas domains such as text or audio have received much less attention. In fact, such
domains imply additional challenges and difficulties. One of the evident differences between domains
is the way in which the information is represented, and, therefore, the way in which adversarial
perturbations are measured, bounded and perceived by human subjects. In the image domain, Lp
norms are mainly used as a basis to measure the distortion between the original signal and the
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Figure 1: Illustration of an adversarial attack, in which an adversarial perturbation is added to a clean
audio waveform, forming an adversarial example which is misclassified by a target DNN model,
while not altering the human perception of the audio.
adversarial example. However, recent works have pointed out that such metrics do not always
properly represent the perceptual distortion introduced by adversarial perturbations [19, 20, 21].
Although in some works Lp norms are also used during the generation of adversarial examples
to limit the amount of perturbation [22, 23], in the audio domain more representative metrics are
usually employed for acoustic signals, such as signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) [24, 25] or Sound Pressure
Level (SPL) [26, 27, 28]. These metrics are computed in decibels (dB), which is a standard scale
employed for acoustic signals. However, even for such metrics, measuring the perceptual distortion
of the attacks is not straightforward, as other characteristics have a high influence, such as time-
frequency properties. In text problems the difficulty of characterizing the perceptual distortion is even
greater, due to the fact that every change is inevitably noticeable, and therefore, the aim is to produce
semantically and syntactically similar adversarial examples [29].
In this paper we focus on the human evaluation of adversarial examples in the audio domain. A
more comprehensive approach to evaluating adversarial distortions can serve to better understand
the risks of adversarial attacks in the audio domain. For instance, the development of adversarial
defenses or secure human machine interaction systems can focus on the more effective, unnoticeable,
attacks. Therefore, the goal of this study is to perform an analysis of the human perception of audio
adversarial perturbations according to different factors. Based on these results, we will also study to
which extent the similarity-metrics employed in the literature are suitable to model such subjective
criterion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the following section we introduce the main
concepts related to adversarial examples and review previous approaches to evaluate the distortion
produced by adversarial perturbation in the audio domain. This section also highlights a number
of research questions related to the evaluation of audio distortion that have not been previously
addressed. Section 3 describes the selected task, target models and dataset, as well as the particular
method employed for generating adversarial perturbation in the audio domain. Section 4 presents
a preliminary evaluation of the adversarial perturbation according to the metrics proposed in the
literature. In Section 5, we present the design of an experiment to find answers to some of the issues
involved in the perceptual evaluation of the perturbations. The results of the experiment in which
18 human subjects evaluate different aspects of the adversarial perturbations are also presented and
discussed. Section 6 concludes the paper and identifies lines for future research.
2 Related work
The existence of adversarial examples which are able to fool DNNs have been reported for many
different audio related tasks, such as automatic speech recognition [22, 30, 31], music content analysis
[32] or sound classification [28]. A common adversarial attack scheme is represented in Fig. 1. Note
that it is assumed that an adversary can feed the perturbed signal directly into the model. Even if this
is a common assumption, some works have demonstrated that such attacks can be designed to work
in the physical world [24, 33, 34].
Our work builds on previous research where adversarial perturbations for audio command classifica-
tion have been introduced [35]. However, the evaluation methods and type of analysis presented in
this paper are valid for other approaches conceived to generate audio adversarial examples for other
ML tasks.
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2.1 Adversarial example: formal description
Let f(x) be a classification model f : X→ Y, which classifies an input x from the input space X as
one of the classes represented inY = {y1, ..., yk}. An adversarial example x′ is defined as x′ = x+v,
where v ∈ Rd represents the adversarial perturbation capable of producing a misclassification of f
for the (correctly classified) input x: f(x) 6= f(x′). A necessary requirement for an adversarial attack
is that the perturbation should be imperceptible, and therefore, the goal is to minimize the distortion
introduced by v as much as possible, according to a suitable distortion metric ϕ(x, x′)→ R
Depending on the objective of the attack, adversarial examples can be categorized in different
ways. First of all, a targeted adversarial example consists of a perturbed sample x′ = x+ v which
satisfies f(x′) = t, where t represents the target (incorrect) label that we want to be produced by the
model. In contrast, an untargeted adversarial example only requires the output label to be incorrect
f(x′) 6= f(x), without any additional regard about the output class assigned to x′.
Furthermore, depending on the scope of the adversarial perturbation v, we can differentiate between
individual or universal adversarial perturbations. In the first case, the perturbation is crafted specifi-
cally to be applied to one particular input x. Therefore, it is not expected that the same perturbation
will be able to fool the model for a different sample. In the second case, universal adversarial
examples are input agnostic perturbations able to fool the model independently of the input. In
[35], different levels of universality are proposed, depending on the number of classes for which
it is expected to work. The first universality level comprises single-class universal perturbations
that are conceived to fool the target model only for inputs of one particular class. We will focus on
single-class universal perturbations, although our findings regarding the weaknesses and gaps in the
evaluation of adversarial perturbations are not restricted to this universality level.
2.2 Methods for assessing audio adversarial perturbations
In this section we collect the strategies employed by previous works in order to verify that audio
perturbations are not detectable by humans. Even if an essential requirement for adversarial perturba-
tions to suppose a real threat is that they must be imperceptible, a good specification of such (mainly
subjective) a constraint is not straightforward, and, indeed, is not well established yet.
Furthermore, even if the analysis is constrained to the audio domain, the understanding and definition
of what can make a sample natural is very related to the ML task that is being solved by the model
(e.g., it might be harder to categorize a music tune as “unnatural” than a spoken command). With a
large variety of ML tasks related to the analysis of acoustic signals (e.g., speech recognition, music
content analysis or ambient sound classification), each of them may require, therefore, a different
criterion to assess the distortion of the adversarial examples according to human perception. Although
a number of strategies have been proposed in these domains [27, 32, 26, 36, 30], we focus on those
suitable for spoken commands. Among these strategies are:
• Thresholding the perturbation amount
• Models of human perception and hearing system
• Human evaluation
2.2.1 Thresholding the perturbation amount
The methods discussed in this section rely on limiting or measuring the perturbation amount that
is added to the original input, according to a distortion metric, to ensure that the perturbations are
imperceptible or quasi-imperceptible, or that the distortion levels are below a maximum acceptable
threshold.
In [22], the perturbation applied to spoken commands is restricted to the 8 least-significant-bits of
a subset of samples in a 16 bits-per-sample audio file. Similarly, in [23], the effectiveness of the
proposed attack for speech paralinguistic tasks is measured for different perturbation amounts under
the `∞ norm. The restrictions applied in both cases guarantee that the maximum change applicable to
each value of the signal is constrained. However, such thresholds are not representative for acoustic
signals, as they do not guarantee a low perceptual distortion on audio attacks.
In [30, 31, 37], in which audio adversarial perturbations for speech recognition models are addressed,
the relative loudness of the adversarial perturbation v with respect to the original signal x is measured
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in Decibels (dB), which is a more representative metric for acoustic signals:
dBx,max(v) = dBmax(v)− dBmax(x), (1)
where
dBmax(x) = max
i
20 log10(xi) (2)
In [25], the signal to noise ratio (SNR) is used to measure the relative distortion of adversarial
perturbations for speech recognition models, computed as:
SNR(x, v) = 10 log10
P (x)
P (v)
, (3)
where P (x) and P (v) represent the power of the clean signal x and the perturbation v, respectively.
The SNR has been used in other works on audio adversarial examples [32, 33, 34, 24, 28]. However,
these works are not based on speech signals, as their approaches rely on data with very different
characteristics, such as urban sound classification, music content analysis or the injection of malicious
commands into songs. Therefore, the results are not directly comparable to spoken speech recognition,
the tasks addressed in this paper.
2.2.2 Models of human perception and hearing system
The human hearing system is able to identify sounds in a range from 20Hz to 20kHz, so that
perturbations outside this range can not be perceived [38, 39]. Based on this fact, in [26] and [27],
high frequencies are used to generate audio inaudible to humans but which is captured and classified
by a device. Although these attacks may not fit in our specification of adversarial examples (since
humans cannot perceive the generated audio, and therefore cannot judge it as benign either), they
introduce the idea of using frequency ranges that are out of the human hearing range in adversarial
scenarios.
A different strategy is employed in [36], where a psychoacoustic model [40] is used to compute
the hearing thresholds of different zones of the clean audio signal, which is used to restrict the
perturbation to the least perceptible parts.
2.2.3 Human evaluation
In [41] and [42], an ABX test is performed, which is a standard method to identify detectable
differences between two choices of sensory stimuli. In this method a subject is asked to listen to two
audios A and B, and afterwards a third audio X, which will be either A or B, randomly selected. The
objective of this test is to assess if the user is able to distinguish between A and B. Optimally, the
accuracy ratio would be 50%, equal to the probability of selecting randomly between the two choices.
In our scenario, the two initial audios A and B would correspond to the clean and perturbed audio (in
any order).
In [24] and [34] the adversarial perturbations are embeded in songs, which can be deployed in the
physical world without raising suspicions for humans listeners (e.g., in elevators or TV advertisements)
to force a target model to understand speech commands. In both works a human evaluation is carried
out on Amazon Mechanical Turk. According to the results presented by the authors, almost none of
the participants perceived speech in the perturbed signals. However, a considerable percentage of
people reported that an abnormal noise could be noticed in the songs.
In [36], a Multiple Stimuli with Hidden Reference and Anchor (MUSHRA) test is carried out [43], to
perform a subjective assessment of the audio quality of adversarial examples. The goal of the test is
to score the quality of perturbed audio signals (anchors, e.g., adversarial examples) with respect to
the original signal (hidden reference, in this context, the original audio).1 According to the results,
the adversarial examples obtained considerably lower scores than the clean audio signals.
Finally, in [44, 33, 22, 23, 25], experiments with human subjects are performed with the aim of
analyzing their response to the task, in order to assess if the adversarial perturbation has any influence
on the responses provided by human listeners. However, no analysis of the perceptual distortion
introduced by the perturbations is reported, except in [25], in which the subjects are asked to evaluate
the noise level of the audio signals.
1It is worth mentioning that this test is mainly used to assess the intermediate quality level of coding systems,
whereas for small impairments, which should be the case of audio adversarial perturbations, dedicated tests have
been proposed.
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2.3 Summary
Despite the fact that different methods have been proposed to measure the distortion levels introduced
by audio adversarial perturbations, we found that the majority of the approaches are not enough to
adequately represent the human perception of these attacks. Apart from that, some of the thresholds
and acceptable distortion levels assumed in previous works do not always guarantee that the perturba-
tions are imperceptible, and therefore, the detectability of the attacks can be questionable. With this
paper, we intend to provide evidence and raise awareness about these gaps. We hope that the results
reported may contribute to establish a more thorough measurement of the distortion, and therefore, to
a more realistic study of audio adversarial examples.
3 Adversarial examples of speech commands
Our goal is to evaluate the detectability of audio adversarial perturbation, and to determine to what
extent the metrics commonly used in the literature agree with the human evaluation. To accomplish
this goal, we should first establish a number of stepping stones:
1. Identify a suitable and representative audio task.
2. Identify a model appropriate for the task
3. Collect or identify a dataset to train a model.
4. Using the model, generate the adversarial examples for the task.
5. Estimate the actual fooling rate of the adversarial examples.
3.1 Selection of the task, model, and dataset
The task we have selected is speech command classification since it is an exemplar machine learning
task which is part of the repertoire of extensively used speech-based virtual assistants.
The DNN model we have selected is based on the architecture proposed for small-footprint keyword
recognition [45]. This model takes as input an audio waveform, computes the spectrogram of
the signal and extracts a set of MFCC features for different time intervals. This results in a two-
dimensional representation of the audio signal, which is fed into the following topology: two
convolutional layers with a ReLU activation function, a fully-connected layer and a softmax layer.
The same architecture has been used in related works on adversarial examples [22, 25] and as a
baseline model in other research tasks [46, 47].
We used the Speech Command Dataset [46], which is a widely used dataset in the study of adversarial
attacks for speech recognition systems [22, 37, 25]. The dataset is composed of recordings of 30
different spoken commands, provided by a large number of different people. Audio files are stored in
a 16-bit WAV file, with a sample-rate of 16kHz and a fixed duration of one second. As in previous
publications [46, 22], we selected the following subset of commands to develop our work: “Yes”,
“No”, “Up”, “Down”, “Left”, “Right”, “On”, “Off”, “Stop”, and “Go”. Additionally, We will also
consider two special classes: “Unknown” (a spoken command not considered in the previous set),
and “Silence” (no speech detected in the audio). Note that this selection comprises a wide variety of
commands in terms of phonetic similarity.
3.2 Generating single-class universal perturbations
As previously mentioned, we focus on single-class universal perturbations, an attack approach that
attempts to generate a single perturbation which is able to fool the model for any input corresponding
to a particular class y. We decided to focus on universal perturbations because an initial experimenta-
tion with individual perturbations (crafted using Deepfool algorithm) led us to the conclusion that
the perturbations were undoubtedly imperceptible. This conclusion has been reported before in the
literature [19] for the case of image adversarial examples. Therefore, we selected the more challeng-
ing task of generating universal perturbations, which requires higher distortion levels. Moreover,
we selected single-class universal attacks in order to study in more detail the results on different
commands. The particular choice of the class to which the target perturbation is applied is a factor
that may influence the perceptual distortion of the perturbations.
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Table 1: Effectiveness of the generated single-class universal perturbations.
Class
Max. FR% Mean FR%
Train Valid Train Valid
Silence 23.80 19.46 22.24 19.61
Unknown 72.70 73.06 70.58 73.51
Yes 74.50 74.36 68.26 66.40
No 86.50 83.77 81.48 79.40
Up 84.20 75.45 82.20 74.73
Down 71.50 65.55 68.06 64.51
Left 52.30 49.73 42.20 40.59
Right 68.70 63.82 60.62 56.47
On 76.00 75.65 54.42 53.28
Off 80.10 73.48 75.18 70.85
Stop 61.40 61.82 56.92 57.30
Go 87.80 80.06 86.24 80.90
The selected attack method is based on the strategy proposed in [48], a state-of-the-art method to
generate universal perturbations based on accumulating individual perturbations created for a set
of training samples using the Deepfool algorithm [49]. We use the UAP-HC reformulation of this
strategy for audio samples as presented in [35], where more details about the process to generate the
perturbations can be found.
We generated 5 different universal perturbations per class, starting from a different training set of
1000 samples in each case. During the crafting process, the universal perturbations were bounded by
the `2 norm, with a threshold value of ξ = 0.1. In addition, the Deepfool algorithm was limited to a
maximum number of 100 iterations. The overshoot parameter of the Deepfool algorithm was set to
0.1. Finally, the UAP-HC algorithm was restricted to 5 epochs, that is, 5 complete passes through the
entire training set.
3.3 Effectiveness of the perturbations fooling the model
To measure the effectiveness of the universal perturbations, we compute the percentage of audios for
which the prediction changes when the perturbation is applied. We will refer to this metric as fooling
ratio (FR) [48]. The effectiveness of the generated perturbations is shown in Table 1, for the training
set (the set of samples used to optimize the universal perturbation) and for the validation set (the set
of samples used to compute the effectiveness of the attack for inputs not used during the optimization
process).2 Results are shown for the average effectiveness of the 5 perturbations generated for each
class, as well as for the one that maximizes the FR on the training set.
According to the results, the generated adversarial examples are highly effective for the majority of
the classes, with a maximum FR above 70% for 7 out of 12 classes in both training and validation sets.
Note that we obtain a considerably high effectiveness also in the class unknown, which is composed
of a diverse set of spoken commands. However, the hardest class to fool is silence, in which the
maximum FR is below 25% in both training and validation sets. This may be due to the fact that,
according to the nature of the audios corresponding to that class, trying to fool the model by adding a
small amount of noise is a challenging task.
It is important to bear in mind that the effectiveness of a universal perturbation is directly correlated
to the distortion amount introduced. We show in Fig. 2, for each class, the way in which the FR
increases as the distortion amount introduced by the perturbations increases. These results have been
obtained by scaling the magnitude of a universal perturbation v according to two distortion criteria:
the `2 norm of the perturbation and the decibel difference between the perturbation and each sample
of the dataset. In the first case, the perturbation signal is scaled in order to ensure that its norm
equals the desired threshold, and it is equally applied to every input sample. In the second case, the
2The samples used to optimize the perturbation will be selected from the training set used to train the DNN.
Equivalently, the validation set of the algorithm will be selected from the validation set used during the training
process of the model.
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Figure 2: Variation in the effectiveness (FR%) in the validation set of the generated single-class
universal adversarial perturbations according to two different criteria: `2 norm of the perturbation
(top) and dBx,max(v) metric with respect to each input signal x (bottom).
perturbation signal is scaled for every input sample x, in order to ensure that the dBx,max(v) metric
equals the specified threshold.
The fact that the FR is directly correlated with the distortion level implies that there is a trade-off
between the effectiveness and the detectability of the attacks. Therefore, to adequately study the
risk posed by audio adversarial attacks, it is important to establish realistic and rigorous criteria for
assessing the human perception of such attacks.
4 Evaluation of the distortion using similarity metrics
While the ability to fool the model is an essential ingredient of adversarial examples, the other
requirement is that the perturbation is not noticed by humans. In this section, we evaluate the
distortion produced by the generated adversarial perturbations, according to different criteria.
4.1 Evaluating the distortion: the standard, uninformed way
We first computed the distortion according to the standard approaches employed in previous works on
adversarial examples in speech related tasks [30, 31, 37], as described in equation (1) (Section 2.2).
In [30], where individual adversarial perturbations are created for speech transcription scenarios, the
mean distortion of the generated perturbations is -31dB, and the 95% interval for distortion ranges
from -15dB to -45dB.3 The same range of distortion is reported in [37]. In [31], where universal
adversarial perturbations are generated also for speech transcription models, the distortion level of
3Note that according to this metric, the lower the distortion value, the less detectable the perturbation.
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Table 2: Distortion levels produced by the generated single-class universal perturbations (standard
evaluation). Results are averaged for the 5 experiments carried out for each class.
Class Mean
dBx,max(v)
% of samples
below -32dB
Silence -29.52 48.04
Unknown -41.35 90.20
Yes -40.58 90.45
No -42.56 93.09
Up -40.24 89.18
Down -40.63 90.64
Left -48.10 99.03
Right -43.30 95.20
On -46.31 96.21
Off -42.01 94.03
Stop -43.92 96.11
Go -41.88 93.28
the perturbations is bounded under different thresholds, obtaining a mean distortion of ≈ −42dB in
the best case, and a mean distortion of ≈ −30dB in the worst case. Overall, distortion levels below
-32dB are considered acceptable in these works.
Fig. 3 shows the distortion level of the generated perturbation with respect to each input sample in
the validation set, according to the same approach. Results are computed independently for each
class, and averaged for the 5 trials carried out in each of them. Table 2 shows the mean distortion
level obtained for each class. As can be seen, the mean distortion is below -40dB in all the classes
except silence, in which the mean distortion is of -29.52dB4. Moreover, without considering the class
silence, more than 90% of the samples are below -32dB in all the cases. Therefore, our perturbations
can be considered as highly acceptable according to this standard.
Figure 3: Distortion level of the generated single-class universal perturbations, evaluated in the
validation set using the standard evaluation approach: dBx,max(v) applied to the whole signals.
Results are averaged for the 5 perturbations generated for each class.
4.2 Evaluating the distortion: detailed and signal-part-informed way
In order to measure the distortion in more detail, we employed the approach presented in [35]. In this
case, the distortion induced by the perturbation v in the original sample x is computed in terms of
4This effect can be explained by the fact that, due to the nature of the samples corresponding to the class
silence, their loudness level is lower than for the rest of classes.
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the difference between both the maximum (as defined in equation (1)) and the mean decibel values,
defined as:
dBx,mean(v) = dBmean(v)− dBmean(x), (4)
where
dBmean(x) = 20 · log
(
1
d
d∑
i=1
|xi|
)
(5)
Furthermore, previous work on evaluating the naturalness of adversarial examples in the audio
domain compute the distortion between two signals by applying the metrics to the entire signals
[30, 37, 31]. In this paper, we advocate the application of both metrics in two different parts of each
audio signal: the vocal part and the background part. This differentiation is due to the fact that, for
spoken commands, the amount of sound outside the vocal part is considerably lower. Thus, the same
amount of perturbation would be perceived differently depending on the infected part. By mapping
the distortive effect of the perturbations to these parts of the signals we also get a better assessment of
how the attack works better.
As we are handling short single-command audio signals, the vocal part of an audio signal x =
{x1...xd} will be delimited by the continuous range [xa, xb] containing 95% of the energy of the
signal, that is: ∑b
i=a x
2
i∑d
i=1 x
2
i
≈ 0.95. (6)
Thus, we will assume that ranges [x1, xa) ∪ (xb, xd] will be composed just of background noise.
Notice that this partition is well suited for single command audios in which it is assumed that the
vocal part of the signal is contiguous. Audio signals belonging to the silence class will be omitted
from the analysis of the vocal part, as they are composed only of background noise, without any
vocal part.
4.3 Results of the different signal-part approach
The results obtained with the described evaluation approach are shown in Fig. 4. The first row of the
figure shows the results obtained using dBx,max(v) metric, and the bottom row the results obtained
using dBx,mean(v) metric. Notice the difference between the horizontal axis scales of the figures.
By comparing the perturbations in the vocal part and the background part, it can be seen that
perturbations in the vocal part are less noticeable, with a decibel difference significantly lower, which
occurs using both dBmax and dBmean distortion metrics.
Regarding the distortion amount in the vocal part, the obtained results are significantly below the
threshold of −32dB in almost all the samples, independently of the metric. Compared to the sound
intensity level of a normal conversation, a distortion of −30dB corresponds to the weakest audible
signal between 10kHz and 100Hz frequency range [50], which is roughly the difference between the
ambient noise in a quiet room and a person talking [30].
While the distortion level outside the vocal part is still acceptable under the dBmax metric, according
to the dBmean metric the distortion exceeds the threshold of -32dB for a great majority of the samples.
In fact, in about half of the cases the difference in decibels is greater than -20dB, which may indicate
that the perturbations could be highly detectable in those parts.
5 Human evaluation of voice command adversarial examples
While the methods presented in the previous section provide a more accurate and detailed assessment
on the quality of the adversarial examples, the metrics used are not expected to capture all the
subtleties of a proper human evaluation. Therefore, we designed an experiment in which human
subjects listen to audio adversarial examples and judge them according to different criteria. The main
goal of the experiment was to study to which extent the perturbations are detectable by humans. In
this section we describe the experimental design and its results.
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Figure 4: Distortion level of the generated single-class universal perturbations, evaluated in the
validation set using dBx,max(v) metric (top row) and dBx,mean(v) metric (bottom row). For each
audio, the distortion has been measured in the vocal part as well as in the background part. Results
are averaged for the 5 perturbations generated for each class.
5.1 Experimental design
A set of eighteen subjects (12 men and 6 women), independent of the research, was selected to
conduct the experiment. Each participant was instructed to listen to different audio clips and answer
some questions about them. The experiment is composed of two parts:
• In the first part, the naturalness of the generated universal adversarial examples is investigated.
The other question investigated is to what extent the distortion produced by the perturbation
affects the understandability of the spoken commands. To address these questions, the
participants are asked to listen a set of 12 audio clips, either clean or adversarially perturbed,
and provide the following information:
– Identify the command that can be heard in the audio clip, in order to determine if the
adversarial perturbations affect the understandability of the spoken commands.
– Assess the level of naturalness of the audio clip, in order to study whether the adversarial
examples are perceived as perturbed audios in comparison to clean instances. As both
clean and perturbed audios will be tested, the comparison between the results obtained
in both cases may reflect if the perturbations are perceived just as a regular background
noise or other ordinary perturbations, or whether they are perceived as artificial or
malicious. In the experiment, the subjects evaluated the naturalness on a scale from 1
to 5, with the following scale provided as reference:
1) Clearly perturbed audio with an artificial sound or noise.
2) The audio is slightly perturbed by an artificial sound or noise, not likely to be
caused by the low quality of the microphones or ambient sounds.
3) Not sure
4) No obvious signs of an artificial perturbation. The detectable perturbations
are likely to be caused by a low- or mid-quality microphone, ambient sounds or
ordinary noises.
5) The audio clip clearly does not contain any artificial perturbation.
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• In the second part of the experiment, each participant performed an ABX test, a method
to identify detectable differences between two choices of sensory stimuli. In this method,
a subject is asked to listen to two audios A and B, and afterwards a third audio X, which
will be either A or B, randomly selected. The goal of the test is to evaluate if the subject is
able to determine if X corresponds to A or to B. In our experiment, the two initial audios A
and B will correspond to the clean and perturbed audio, in any order. Thus, this test will
determine if the perturbations are detectable in comparison to the clean audio sample. Six
trials were carried out in each experiment, that is, six sets of three audio clips A, B and X.
Due to the fact that the audio clips of the dataset contain different characteristics, such as the intensity
of the spoken command or the amount of background noise, the perception of a perturbation may
change according to these features. For this reason, we decided to classify the audios considering
three levels of intensity: low, medium and high. The dBmean distortion metric presented in (5) will
be used to measure the mean distortion of the audio signals. According to this metric, 99% of the
intensities of the audio samples lie approximately in the decibel range [30, 85]. By performing a
rough uniform binning of the intensity range (known as equal-width binning in the literature [51]),
the levels were defined as follows:
• Low intensity level: audios with a mean distortion below 50dB.
• Medium intensity level: audios with a mean distortion between 50dB and 70dB.
• High intensity level: audios with a mean distortion above 70dB.
To ensure a uniform representation of the different levels of intensity, each experiment was composed
of audio signals of only one of these levels. Nine different experiments were created, (three exper-
iments per intensity level), and each of them was assigned to two different participants, making a
total of 18 experiments and participants. A summary of the final experimental setup is provided in
Table 3. The minor unbalance in the number of original and modified audios in the first part of the
experiment is assumed to ensure greater uniformity in the frequency of each command, depending
on the different factors influencing the experiment, as shown in Table 4, as well as to ensure that
the model correctly classified the original audio samples but incorrectly classified the adversarial
examples.
5.2 Analysis of the results
5.2.1 Command classification task
The first factor to be analyzed is the accuracy percentage obtained by humans in the command
classification task (first part of the experiment), that is, which percentage of samples have been
correctly labeled by humans.
According to the results, the total number of instances wrongly classified considering all the instances,
clean and adversarial, is 13 out of 216 (9 corresponding to clean samples and 4 to adversarial
samples), which corresponds to a total accuracy in the command classification of ∼ 94%. In order
Table 3: Summary of the experimental setup designed for the human evaluation of the distortion
produced by the universal perturbations.
Experiment Intensity
Audio samples (part 1) ABX trials
(part 2)Clean Adv. Total
1 Low 6 6 12 6
2 Low 6 6 12 6
3 Low 5 7 12 6
4 Medium 6 6 12 6
5 Medium 6 6 12 6
6 Medium 7 5 12 6
7 High 6 6 12 6
8 High 6 6 12 6
9 High 7 5 12 6
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Table 4: Number of audios per command used in the experiment (part 1).
Type Sil. Unk. Yes No Up Down Left Right On Off Stop Go
Low intensity 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 6 6 8 6
Medium intensity 6 4 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
High intensity 6 12 8 6 0 12 4 8 2 2 4 8
Clean 12 2 8 12 4 22 12 4 4 12 14 4
Adversarial 6 20 14 6 8 2 4 14 10 2 4 16
Total Frequency 18 22 22 18 12 24 16 18 14 14 18 20
to provide more detailed information, the accuracies obtained for each intensity level are shown in
Fig. 5, in which the percentages are computed independently for clean instances and for adversarial
examples. Overall, these results indicate that the adversarially perturbed spoken commands are
clearly recognizable and well classified by humans, independently of the intensity level of the original
audio. In other words, although the adversarial perturbations are able to fool the target model, they
do not affect the human understanding of the command. The obtained results are consistent with
those achieved in [25], where the success rate of a set of people in classifying audio commands is
reported using the same dataset as us, but without considering silence or unknown as classes and
without differentiating between the intensity level of the original signals. According to the results
reported in [25], the accuracy in recognizing the commands was 93.5% for clean samples and 92.0%
for adversarial examples.
Figure 5: Accuracy percentages achieved by the participants of the experiment in the speech command
classification task. Results have been split for each sample type (clean or adversarial) as well as for
the intensity levels of the original audios in the experiments (low, medium or high).
5.2.2 Naturalness
Furthermore, the results obtained in the analysis of the naturalness level assigned to the instances
is displayed in Fig. 6. The figure shows the frequencies with which samples are classified in each
naturalness level, split according to the sample type (clean or adversarial). In addition, the results are
jointly computed for all the experiments (top left) as well as for each intensity level individually: low
(top right), medium (bottom left) and high (bottom right). Considering all the experiments, it can be
observed that the adversarial examples obtained lower scores in comparison to the clean samples.
We verified by an exact multinomial statistical test that there exist significant differences regarding
the scores assigned to clean and adversarial audios (achieving a p-value below a tolerance of 0.01).
Indeed, while 65.5% of the clean samples are classified with a naturalness level of 4 or 5, only 33%
of adversarial examples have been classified in the same range. These results indicate that, in general,
the adversarial perturbations are perceived in the audio signals as artificial sounds or noises with a
considerably higher frequency than clean samples.
Doing the same analysis independently for each intensity level, it can be observed that the main
difference is given in the lowest intensity level, in which 86.9% of the adversarial examples achieved
a score of 1 or 2, while only 14.7% of clean samples were classified in that range. For the highest
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intensity level, however, the percentage of adversarial examples scored with a 4 or 5 is even greater
than the corresponding percentage for clean samples. Thus, the human perception of the adversarial
examples is clearly related to the intensity level of the original audio signals. This is a remarkable
fact that should be taken into consideration in the evaluation of audio adversarial examples.
Figure 6: Analysis of the naturalness level assigned to the audio samples of the speech command
classification task in all the experiments, split by sample type (clean or adversarial). The results are
computed for all the experiments (top left) as well as for each intensity level individually: low (top
right), medium (bottom left) and high (bottom right).
5.2.3 ABX test
In order to better evaluate if the perturbations are perceivable, the results obtained in the ABX test
(second part of the experiment) have been analyzed. This is summarized in Fig. 7. The first row of the
figure shows the percentage of success cases in the ABX test, that is, the percentage of cases in which
the unknown audio (audio X) has been correctly classified. The second row shows the confidence
level of the answers. All these results have been computed independently for each intensity level.
The success rate of the experiments with low and medium intensity levels is of 97.2% and 91.7%
respectively, revealing that the perturbations are clearly perceivable in such cases. On the contrary,
only a 55.6% success rate is achieved for high intensity levels, close to the optimum value of 50%,
which is equivalent to a random guessing. We verified by an exact binomial test5 that the achieved
success ratio is no significantly greater (achieving a p-value of ≈ 0.31) than the probability p = 0.5
corresponding to a binomial distribution X ∼ B(n = 36, p = 0.5), where n is the sample size.
This fact indicates that, in such cases, the adversarial examples are not distinguishable from their
corresponding clean audio examples. It is worth noting that, given our experimental setup, 95%
(Clopper–Pearson) confidence intervals of the success ratio is [0.85, 0.99] for low intensity audios,
[0.78, 0.98] for medium intensity audios and [0.38, 0.72] for high intensity audios. The results
provided can, therefore, be considered representative of the human perception of the distortion.
Consistently with the success rates, the subjects were highly confident in providing their answers
in more than 75% of the cases in the experiments containing audios with low and medium intensity
levels. Contrarily, in 75% of the answers the participants reported a low confidence in the experiments
containing audios with high intensity levels.
5The alternative hypothesis of the test is that the empirical success ratio is greater than p = 0.5. The same
test with the alternative hypothesis that the empirical ratio is not equal to 0.5 obtained a p-value of ≈ 0.62.
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Overall, these analyses demonstrate that the detectability of the perturbations largely depends on the
intensity level of the clean audio, being detectable for audios with low and medium intensity levels,
but not perceivable for audios with a high intensity level.
It is worth mentioning that, according to the standard approach used in previous related works to
measure the detectability of audio adversarial examples, the crafted perturbations were far below the
maximum acceptable distortion. However, the results obtained in this section reinforce our proposal
about the need to employ more rigorous approaches in order to measure and set a threshold on the
distortion produced by the adversarial perturbations in a more representative way. We encourage
the reader to listen to some adversarial examples, to empirically assess the perceptual distortion of
adversarial perturbations according to different characteristics.6
Figure 7: Success percentages obtained in the ABX test (top) and confidence levels of the answers in
the test (bottom), both computed independently for each intensity level.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have addressed the measurement of the perceptual distortion of audio adversarial
examples, which remains a challenging task despite being a fundamental condition for effective
adversarial attacks. For this purpose, we have performed an analysis of the human perception of audio
adversarial perturbations for speech command classification tasks, and this analysis has been used to
study whether the distortion metrics employed in the literature correlate with the human judgment.
We have found out that, while the distortion levels of our perturbations are acceptable according to
the standard evaluation approaches employed by convention, the same perturbations were highly
detectable and judged as artificial by human subjects. For this reason, we have proposed a novel
framework to measure the distortion in a more comprehensive way, based on a differential analysis
in the vocal and background parts of the audio signals, which provide a more realistic and rigorous
evaluation of the perceptual distortion. Our experiments with single-class universal perturbations for
a set of varied commands also demonstrate that there exist differences regarding the effectiveness of
the attacks, related to the relative distortion, and how the perceptual distortion of the perturbations
changes depending on the intensity levels of the audio signal in which it is injected.
6https://vadel.github.io/adversarialDistortion/AdversarialPerturbations.html
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These results highlight the lack of audio metrics capable of modeling the human perception in a
realistic and representative way, and stress the need to include human evaluation as a necessary
step for validating methods used to generate adversarial perturbation in the audio domain. We hope
that future works could advance in this direction in order to fairly evaluate the risk that adversarial
examples suppose.
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